REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES POLICY: U.S. MILITARY USE OF COMMERCIAL SEALIFT
The movement of U.S. military equipment and material via the sea during times of peace and conflict is, for the most part, a story of phenomenal success. U.S. military history is replete with examples of successfully moving mountains of military cargo across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to far away lands. Why has the U.S. been so successful at moving vast amounts of Department of Defense (DoD) material from primarily continental bases, depots, and factories to distant destinations in relatively short periods of time? The answers lie in the U.S. strategy for building, maintaining, and accessing strategic merchant maritime shipping capability when DoD requires it.
Historical Review In 1776 in his An Inquiry in to the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations

Adam Smith penned:
Since such, therefore, are the advantages of water-carriage, it is natural that the first improvements of art and industry should be made where this conveniency opens the whole world for a market to the produce of every sort of labour... preserve an American merchant maritime shipping capability. 2 In 1817, Congress enacted the Navigation Acts, which barred foreign vessels from participating in U.S. domestic commerce. 3 Nations practiced the exclusive domestic right to transport passengers and goods between ports within its own territory to protect national shipping interests. 4 By enacting U.S. maritime commerce legislation, Congress helped create and maintain a viable U.S. merchant maritime or "Merchant Marine" fleet consisting of the nation's civilian-owned merchant ships. Either the U.S. Government or the U.S.
private commercial sector can operate this fleet as it carries cargo through the navigable waters of the U.S.. It operates during peace and serves as an auxiliary to the Navy to carry military troops and supplies during times of war. 5 To understand how the U.S. built the current U.S. Merchant Marine capability and its effect on our ability to conduct global military operations, it is critical to examine flagged commercial vessels when shipping government items. 6 In section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly referred to as the Jones Act, Congress reserved the right for U.S. flagged vessels to carry all marine transportation of freight and passengers within the U.S. It further stated these vessels must be owned by U.S. citizens, be built by U.S. ship building companies, be registered in the U.S. and be manned with a crew consisting of all U.S. officers and a seventy-five percent U.S. crew. These vessels became known as the "Jones Act Fleet. In order to ensure compliance with the legislative mandates and executive directives pertaining to sealift, DoD provides its own policy direction. It is DoD's position that the sealift portion of the Defense Transportation System (DTS), a subset of the MTS, which is a subset of the National Transportation System (NTS), is capable of providing lift to meet DoD requirements across the spectrum of military operations. As directives dictate, DoD shippers must use DTS commercial lift assets unless there is a documented critical mission impact. 20 The Directive does note that services provided within the DTS should be streamlined, flexible, cost effective, and responsive to the customer. However, policy interpretation has proven that meeting the critical impact standard extremely difficult.
The policy directs all shipment requirements to be transported on U.S. owned vessels except when terms of a treaty, lack of shipping routes or when rates are Although, U.S. flagged vessels carry between three and four percent of all international cargo, the Cargo Preference Laws have had little effect on maintaining the amount of overall U.S. cargo carried on U.S. flagged vessels to foreign ports. 33 This is because most cargo shipped to international destinations is owned by commercial companies and is not subject to cargo preference laws. Short-term profits lead commercial companies to seek the least cost shippers, which usually means using foreign flagged carriers due to lower operating costs.
Higher operating costs for U.S. flagged vessels are directly attributable to higher costs for the crews and safety requirements; higher wages and benefits, higher manning levels, and higher maintenance safety standards. Other increased costs include higher operating costs for steam powered vessels and maintaining older vessels. Half of the 165 U.S. flagged vessels engaged in international trade are near their life expectancy. 34 An additional factor deals with costs associated with U.S.
shipyard repairs or if U.S. flagged vessels are not built in U.S. shipyards, the Tariff fleet. 36 The departure of those vessels would result in an estimated 6,000 mariners losing their jobs or about 71 percent of the shipboard jobs associated with U.S. flagged vessel conducting international shipping. 37 In December of 1968, when asked to review the legal challenge brought against the DoD sealift policy, the GAO, using the 1904 Cargo Preference Act, recommended continuing support of the law. The challenge concerned the use of Great Lakes ports and foreign vessels for shipment overseas of military troop support cargo to save time, money, or distance. In the recommendation, the GAO stated that provided American flagged vessels were available, the 1904 Preference Act indicates that cost considerations and time related concerns could not be used to avoid the statutory requirement. It further stated that under normal circumstances, the time factor is not as important in the case of cargo transportation. In the event that no U.S. vessels are available or if the President of the United States deems rates are excessive, the law allows for exceptions. 38 In 2007, The DoD Inspector General considered allegations that USTRANSCOM used a commercial vessel rather than a more cost-effective Government vessel to transport military equipment to Fort Irwin, California. The allegation stipulated that USTRANSCOM spent $6 million more than necessary. The IG initially ruled that the allegation was unsubstantiated because USTRANSCOM followed DoD sealift policy.
The ruling was later modified with a recommendation that USTRANSCOM conduct a more thorough analysis of cost associated with moving previously activated Government-chartered vessels operating in other parts of the world before considering commercial sealift options. 39 Daily operating costs for chartered vessels while underway are relatively constant. Depending on the length of the voyage required to pick up the cargo, it may be less expensive to use chartered vessels when moving deployment cargo as compared to a commercial option. However, the length of time the cargo can wait before deployment may be a limiting factor. Chartered vessels rarely sit idle but are usually loaded with cargo and enroute to a delivery destination. They are also scheduled to pick up and deliver cargo well in advance to ensure that their capacity is utilized to its fullest. Altering a chartered vessel's schedule, once cargo is booked for a future pick up date, has a secondary time delay impact on all other scheduled cargo. commercial maritime industry require innovative thinking and perhaps a change in our overall sealift concept.
Recommendation
One possible military sealift alternative could be centered on a concept that focuses entirely on a commercial approach for all three phases of military sealift requirements. This concept could require selling or leasing all current U.S. Government owned capability to U.S. commercial maritime companies with a very clearly defined agreement that such assets plus additional assets from the company could be made available, whenever required. All pre-positioning vessels could be on long-term leases.
All surge vessels could be on short-term leases with quick transfer times from the commercial sector to military availability. Sustainment requirements would remain in the commercial sector. During peacetime, VISA should remain in place but the MSP could be stopped completely and a certain number of vessels could be on short-term lease to DoD in order to handle sealift requirements for CJCS sponsored exercises.
Potential positive attributes of this alternative would include:
-DoD could receive income back from the sale or lease of vessels.
-The U.S. commercial sealift industry could receive an additional fleet of LMSR's and FSS's plus any vessels from the RRF that could be adapted to a commercial enterprise.
-Vessels added to the commercial fleets could be used on a more continuous, cost effective basis.
-RRF vessels not used by the commercial industry could be scrapped and the reserve fleet abolished saving maintenance dollars.
-In place of MSP with its associated costs, DoD could be a paying partner with the commercial maritime industry to enhance and improve overall sealift capability. DoD would pay a portion of the maintenance costs for vessels leased to commercial companies, making these companies more competitive. DoD could partner with commercial companies for the purchase of new vessels.
-Overall maintenance and administration of the fleet could be done more efficiently by a competitive commercial entity vice a government entity.
For the Pre-position and Sustainment phases, there should be little to no impact of this alternative approach. Some operational risk is assumed, as it is not well known if the commercial industry could meet DoD timelines for deployment during the surge phase. To test the feasibility and associated risk of the concept, DoD should provide a few vessels on short-term leases to the commercial industry and then conduct a number of "no-notice" DoD activations.
Clearly, a change of this magnitude would require a lot of discussion and buy-in from a number of different entities to include the President and Congress as well as the commercial maritime industry. Although there are no guarantees of success, what is certain is that most of the Government owned sealift fleet is beyond its life expectancy and will need re-capitalization immediately. DoD sealift requirements will undoubtedly continue during this time of persistent conflict, however; current policies are impacting military readiness and clearly the status quo is unacceptable.
Conclusion
History shows that our military successes around the globe have hinged on our ability to project military forces rapidly and in sufficient volume to ensure overwhelming force, when required. Sealift is the only viable mode that can meet military deployment high volume requirements. One LMSR carries the equivalent of up to 300 C-17 flights. 46 Both the Executive and Congressional Branches of our government view the U.S.
commercial maritime industry as critical to the strategic health and defense of our great nation. It is evident that in order to remain viable and competitive in the global market, the U.S. maritime industry must be protected. To this end, Congress continues to enact "Cargo Preference" laws. There are strong arguments that suggest subsidizing an industry and preventing it from interacting with market economy forces hurt the industry in the long run. In the case of the U.S. maritime industry, the over riding principle of national security dictates its support. U.S. military response cannot be left subservient to commercial enterprises. However, commercial companies are clearly more efficient at operating sealift vessels than the U.S. Government. By enacting the recommended sealift alternative, DoD can eliminate its aging sealift fleet and help support the U.S. maritime industry. This new way of conducting DoD sealift will meet both U.S. national transportation and defense goals. Placing our nation's security at risk by perhaps relying on global foreign flagged vessels to quickly deliver U.S. military equipment and material to areas of conflict is not an acceptable alternative.
